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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

IRA ROYAL L. TRIBE, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
I Case No.
I
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

13856

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF:
OGDEN CITY, BRIGHAM CITY, PROVO CITY
AND CITY OF ST. GEORGE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for a declaratory judgment to determine constitutionality of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 11-19-1,
et seq. (1973), and of actions taken and proposed to be
taken by the Defendants and Respondents pursuant to
to such act and to determine the proper interpretation
of certain provisions of such act
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court, sitting without a jury, was presented
documentary and testimonial evidence and entered declaratory judgment as prayed in the coiinterclaim of Defendants and Respondents holding that the Utah Neighborhood Development Act (hereinatfer referred to as
"The Act") is constitutional and that certain resolutions
of certain of the Defendants are lawful and valid, including resolutions approving a plan for the issuance of bonds
by the Salt Lake City Redevelopment Agency ("Redevelopment Agency or Agency") for the payment of which
certain parking revenues and "tax increments" are
pledged.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANTS
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment of the trial
court and a declaration that the Act and the activities
undertaken and proposed by the Respondents pursuant
thereto are violative of both state and federal law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
We concur with Appellant's statement of facts as
supplemented and amplified by the Respondent.
ARGUMENT
POINT L
THE UTAH NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT, PROVIDING ENABLING LEGISLATION FOR THE CREATION OF THE
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY DOES NOT
VIOLATE ARTICLE VI, SECTION 28 OF
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WHICH PROHIBITS THE LEGISLATURE FROM DELEGATING TO A SPECIAL COMMISSION
THE POWER TO MAKE, SUPERVISE OR
INTERFERE WITH A MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENT OR TO PERFORM MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS.
Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah Constitution was
seemingly adopted to an effort to seek relief from state
legislative control over municipal corporations. Section
28 (referred to as the Ripper clause) expressly withdraws
from the legislature the power to create special commissions to deal with municipal functions. These commissions are prohibited because they take the functions of
local government from elected municipal officials and
placed them in the hands of appointed commissioners
over whom the local taxpayers have no control.
Under the Utah Neighborhood Development Act the
municipal corporation together with the legislature are
put in a position that through a joint concerted effort
the far reaching impact of deteriorating central city areas
can and will be rehabilitated, refurbished, or remodeled
without tiie necessity of expenditure from city, county
or state.
A. THERE IS NO LEGISLATURE DELEGATION TO THE REDEVELOPMENT
AGENCY.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Utah Neighborhood Development Act, Title 11,
Chapter 19, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in
Section 11-19-3 that each community by enactment of an
ordinance by its legislative body may organize a redevelopment agency designating the legislative body of the
community as the redevelopment agency.
There is simply no delegation by the state legislature
inasmuch as the acceptance and desire to use the act is
completely discretionary upon the acceptance by the
legislative body of the municipality and if accepted, the
same people are the legislative body of the city and the
redevelopment agency. This then provides the municipal
voters not only a direct voice and control over the initiation of the act but also control over the functioning
of the agency and lastly if necessary the termination of
the entire program.
Appellant cited this court decision in Carter v. Beaver
County Service Area No. 1, 16 Utah 2d 280, 399 P. 2d
440 (1965), as authority for the invalidation of an act
even though there was a provision for initiation of the
district by the county. In Carter a taxpayer challenged a
county service area act with regard to bonding and building a hospital to serve a district near Beaver. In invalidating the entire law without specific discussion of the
challenged service area, the Court found:
"The County Service Area Act authorizes
the performance of an unlimited number of activities; some of these might qualify as a function
appropriately performed by a state agency, while
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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others are exclusively municipal functions, the
performance of which is constitutionally limited
to the unite of local government." 399 P. 2d at
441.
This case was decided on the issue of vagueness of
the statute in being overly broad. The issue of local legislative consent was not discussed and appellant's contention that it was implicit that the consent of the county
was not sufficient to avoid the prohibition of Article VI,
Section 28 is unfounded.
Appellant cites the case of Backman v. Salt Lake
County, 13 Utah 2d 412, 275 P. 2d 756 (1962), wherein
the legislature passed an act providing for a special election which if approved would incorporate a civic auditorium district. The court found the county failed to
follow the procedure in timing set out by the Act and
on that particular point the court held there was an invalidation. After the court's holding in the Backman case,
there was a certain amount of dictum with regard to the
constitutionality of delegation to a commission under
municipal functions, however, even in the dictum there
was no direct discussion on the local municipal consent
doctrine. This court in subsequent decisions has expressly
limited the Backman case to the issue of failure to comply with procedural timing of the bond election, Branch
v. Salt Lake County Service Area No. 2, 23 Utah 2d 181,
460 P. 2d 814 (1969).
In at least two cases, this court has focused on the
importance of local consent and initiation of a particular
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act, thereby eliminating the direct delegation violation
found in the constitutional provision. In Lehi City v.
Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530 (1935), this court sustained the creation of a Metropolitan Water District
which, pursuant to statute would be approved by the
majority of voters within the district boundaries. The
court in its discussion of the constitutional provision, the
same provision in issue in the instant case, remarked,
"If it be objected that the legislature in this manner is
usurping some of the power of local self-government, the
answer is that before a metropolitan water district can
be organized it must have a majority vote of the electors
within the district in support thereof and such vote carries with it an approval of the method by which the
officers of the district shall be selected." 48 P. 2d at 536.
The court in Lehi relied on the California case of
City of Pasadena v. Chamberlain, 204 Cal. 653, 269 P.
630 (1928). (Mifornia has essentially the same constitutional provisions as Utah and in holding that California Metropolitan Water District did not violate the
"Ripper clause" the California court reasoned that the
people themselves, not the legislature, had consummated
the formation of the district. Later in State Water Pollution Board v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 2d 247, 311 P. 2d
370 (1951), this court again acknowledged that there
was no direct delegation in cases of local consent and
initiation. The Court said: "However, that and similar
cases, are clearly distinguishable in that the metropolitan water district was initiated by the cities desiring the
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district and there was no direct delegation by the legislature to a board or agency which would allow it to interfere with any municipal improvement, property, or function." 311 P. 2d at 376.
We would conclude that the ruling in Lehi and Water
Pollution Board providing for the approval by the people
of the particular municipality is still in effect as well it
should be. Such a finding is consistent with the high
courts of other jurisdictions as consented by the appellant
in his brief. In City of Whittier v. Dickson, 24 Cal. 2d
665,151 P. 2d 5 (1944). Housing Authority v. Dockweiler,
14 Cal. 2d 37, 94 P. 2d 794 (1939); the California court
has held that there is no delegation in violation of the
constitutional provisions when a local option is provided.
The Colorado Court has reached the same conclusion in
a variety of decisions including City of Aurora v. Aurora
Sanitation District, 122 Colo. 407, 149 P. 2d 662 (1944)
and City of Denver v. Londery 33 Colo. 104, 80 P. 117
(1905).
Finally the appellant submits that there is unconstitutional delegation inasmuch as the legislature is the
source of the powers of cities and if the legislature cannot
act because of constitutional limitations then the legislature cannot delegation to its agents, the cities and counties, the power to so act. Such an argument is not consistent with the intent or Article VI, Section 28. The
evil to be prevented by Section 28 is total domination
by the legislature upon the municipalities and to prevent
a separation of the power to incur debt and the responsi-
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bility for payment. Section 28 was drafted and adopted
to protect the municipality from the legislature, not from
the will of the municipal voters.
B. A REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO THE UTAH
NEIGHBORHOOD ACT IS NOT A SPECIAL COMMISSION, PRIVATE CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION.
The appellant correctly points out that the functions
of a redevelopment agency may be somewhat separate
from the functioning of the local municipality inasmuch
as the agency may employ its own officers and employees,
maintain separate offices; separate accounting records,
separate payrolls and separate budget. The act in 1119-3 also provides: " . . . which agency shall be authorized
to enter into contracts generally and shall have power
to transact the business and exercise all the powers provided for in this act."
Although the agency maintains separation from the
city structure, this is not the fear the framers of our
State Constitution had as pointed out in the Backman
case by Justice Henroid, "We are convinced that the
framers of our constitution wisely anticipated the inroads
that might be cut in the structure of local, representative
government, which fundamentally is composed of officials
elected by those closest to government, the electors, when
they judiciously insisted on Article VI, Section 29 as a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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must in our a>nstitution." This court's concern as expressed by Justice Henroid appeared to have far reaching
effect on the legislature in the drafting of this particular
act inasmuch as not only must the agency be organized
through an ordinance by the city's legislative body but
the legislative body of the community becomes the redevelopment agency of said community. The electors of
the community then have a direct voice in the affairs of
the agency because they in fact can remove a member
of the agency board at the ballot box. We submit to the
court that the agency is subject to the governing body
of the local disitrict and therefore cannot be classified
as a private corporation or association, or a special commission. Again we emphasize to the court that Article
VI, Section 29 was drafted to protect the local area government from the legislature but not from the will of the
local voter.
C. THE AGENCY WILL NOT INTERFERE
WITH MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENT
AND THE PERFORMANCE OF MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS.
In Backman v. Salt Lake County, supra, the court,
after deciding that case on a procedural defect provided
that in order to violate Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah
Constitution three conditions are necessary. 1) Delegation to a private commission of power; 2) To interfere
with municipal property, or 3) to perform a municipal
function. If the court holds that in fact there is no deleDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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gation to a private commission of power then determination of a breach the latter two conditions would be moot.
Although the appellant contends that there will be
direct interference with municipal improvements in asmuch as there would be traffic rerouting together with
some changes in water and sewer lines, certainly, this
type of temporary construction interference was not contemplated by those responsible for putting Article VI,
Section 29 into our Constitution.
The trial court found after the presentation of evidence, in Finding of Fact No. 10, which is uncontested
by the appellants, as follows:
"10. The problems relating to urban blight
affect the entire state. The negative economic
drain of central city areas which should be highly
productive, the law enforcement problems effecting visitors and residents alike, the health problems which spread their infectious consequences
rapidly over enormous areas inhabited by a mobile population, the fire hazards of a congested
dilapidated center of population, and inadequate
parking accommodations, the limited access to
recreation center, convention facilities and tourist
attractions are matters of primary concern for
the entire state rather than problems involving
purely local functions. Thus, the Redevelopment Agency Plan of which the $15,000,000 bond
issue is an integral part is a proposal which will
have state wide impact."
The higher court in California and Colorado reached
the same conclusion as our local trial court, that redeDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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velopment is a function that affects the entire state and
is a state function and not just a municipal function because of the far reaching impact of crime, health and
economic drain. Fellom v. Redevelopment Agency, 157
Cal. App. 2d 243, 320 P. 2d 884 (1958); In re Bunker Hill
Urban Renewal Project, IB, 37 Cal. Rep. 74, 389 P. 2d
538 (1964); Rabinaff v. District Court, 360 P. 2d 114
(Colo. 1961; People v. Newton, 101 P. 2d 21 (Colo. 1940).
The court in ruling on the issue presented in light
of Article VI, Section 29, could dispose of the matter
disregarding any acceptance or rejection of what has been
termed the State Purpose Doctrine by concluding that
there was no delegation to a special commission in the
case at bar.
POINT II.
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY BONDS ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE UTAH NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT DO NOT
CONSTITUTE A DEBT OF THE CITY
WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE XIV
SECTION 3 AND 4 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Section 3, of Article XIV provides that no county,
school district, city, town, village, or any subdivision
thereof will incur a debt which cannot be paid during the
current year from revenues of that year unless that debt
is submitted and authorized by a vote of the majority
of qualified electors who vote in the election. Section 4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of Article XIV then provides the limit of indebtedness
that can be incurred pursuant to Section 3.
A. THE REDEVELOPMENT A G E N C Y
BONDS ARE NOT TO BE CONSIDERED
AN OBLIGATION OF THE CITY BECAUSE THE AGENCY IS NOT A SUBDIVISION OF THE CITY.
The appellant contends that the Utah Neighborhood
Development Act does not create a redevelopment agency
that is a separate body, politic and corporate, or as a
separate political subdivision of the State in express language. Appellant then characterizes the non-existence of
such a statement as being of great significance for the
application of the Constitution debt limits and election
requiremnets.
An evaluation and study of the act itself leaves no
questions as to the intent of the legislature in setting up
an agency separate from the affairs of the city when
compared to a department or subdivision of the said city.
The act is so implicit as to the separation from the city
that direct expressions of intent would become redundant.
In the same section of the Act that provides for initiation
by the legislative body of the community, it sets out
some of the powers of the agency. ". . . which agency
may accept financial or other assistance from any public
or private source for the agency's activities, powers, and
duties, and expend any funds so received for any of the
purposes of this act. The agency may borrow money or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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accept financial or other assistance from the state or the
federal government for any redevelopment project within
[its area of] operation and comply with any conditions
of such loan or grant." 11-9-3. A pursual of other sections of the act, including but not limited to 11-19-12, 1119-20,11-19-23.1,11-19-23.9,11-19-23.2 and 11-19-25 should
be sufficient to sximmarily dismiss appellant's contention
for the necessity of an express statement that the agency
is separate from the municipality.
There being no question as to the intent of the act
in setting up a separate entity one must focus on the
judiciary as to the validation of such a special entity. In
the leading case, in this area, of Lehi City v. Meiling, 87
Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530 (1935), the court ruled on the
contention that the metropolitan water district act violated Article XIV Section 3 and 4 of the Constitution
limiting debt on municipal corporations. The district provided for in the act could include the area of a number
of local governments. The court held the district was
quasi-municipal meeting some of the powers and attributes of a municipality. The concept of quasi-municipal
districts is reiterated in a variety of cases including Freeman v. Stewart, 2 Utah 2d 319, 273 P. 2d 174 (1954),
wherein the court referred to the principle set out in
Lehi City as one which the people have relied on and
should not be taken away by the court. In Provo City
v. Evans, 87 Utah 292, 48 P. 2d 555 (1935), decided at
the same time as Lehi, and Barlow v. Clearfield, 1 Utah
2d 419, 268 P. 2d 682 (1954), the court did not impose
debt limitation on quasi-municipalities which had the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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same geographic boundaries as the city, thereby discrediting any argument the quasi-municipality concept applies only to special district encompassing more than one
local government.
Again it should be emphasized that the legislature
appears to have followed the guidelines as set out by this
court's decision, in drafting an act enabling local cities
to initiate a redevelopment agency without direct delegation or interference with the municipality and providing the local elector to have control over the agency board;
and at the same time make certain that the agency is a
quasi-municipality, separate and distinct from the local
city and in no way a subdivision or a department of that
city. The organization of the agency as set out by the
act is a reflection of this Court's decisions.
B. REDEVELOPMENT BONDS DO NOT
CONSTITUTE A DEBT OF THE CITY.
If tins court finds that an agency established under
the Utah Neighborhood Development Act does qualify
as a division of the city then we would strongly contend
that agency bonds do not constitute a debt within the
scope of Article XIV of our Constitution, because the
bonds together with all interest will be paid from a special
fund.
This Court adopted the doctrine of the special fund
in Barnes v. LehiCity, 74 Utah 321, 279 Pac. 878 (1929),
which doctrine is adhered to in the majority of jurisdictions, 96 A. L. R. 1385 (1953), 72 A. L. R. 687 (1931).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The doctrine allows municipalities to construct or
renew needed utilities, to keep up with the needed urbanization without placing an additional burden on the
taxpayer. In Barnes the City of Lehi contracted to purchase generating equipment to increase the capacity of
an electric plant, financed by the issuance of pledge
orders. The only source of payment was to be a special
fund generated by the revenues produced from the electric plant. This court held the obligation was not a debt
of the city as set out in Article XIV of the Utah Constitution.
Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P. 2d 144
(1933), placed some limitation on the special fund doctrinew here the special fund would create a drain on the
general fund In Fjeldsted the city owned and maintained
an existing waterworks supply and distribution system.
The revenues thereby derived were to be put in the general fund after necessary expenditures. The city sought
to improve and repair the waterworks system by issuing
bonds. The revalues from the waterworks system would
then be placed in a special fund to retire the bonds where
formerly the revenue would pour into the general fund.
The court in Fjeldsted distinguished Barnes pointing out
that in the Barnes case the electric plant was so dilapidated that it was bringing no revenues into the city and
general fund and the city would lose nothing when the
revenues from the new plant would be placed in the general fund In Fjeldsted the court pointed out that ". . .
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in this case a large income from an existing waterworks
system owned by the city is pledged to pay the principal
and interest on the bonds; the greater part of the property to be purchased or improvements made will be incorporated or built into the existing waterworks in such
a manner that it could not be thereafter segregated or
withdrawn without destruction of the new property and
destructive impairment of the entire system." 28 Pac.
at 28.
•
The court's apparent concern in Fjeldsted in distinguishing from Barnes was that Ogden City could not
segregate revenue resulting from the proposed repairs and
modifications. In fact Ogden City conceded that there
would be no new source of revenue. The court concluded
in Fjeldsted that an additional burden would be placed
upon the taxpayers inasmuch as they would be forced to
make up the deficit in the general fund that would result
from diversion of revenue from the existing waterworks
system.
The facts in Fjeldsted are distinguishable from the
tax increment concept of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act. In tax increment no existing revenues going into the general fund will be diverted into a special
fund. The revenues from the existing valuations will
continue to be used as they now exist and revenues which
come about because of the improvements will be put in
a special fund to pay off the bonds. This concept is
clearly within guidelines of the Barnes case and just as
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clearly exempt from the holding in Fjeldsted inasmuch as
only the revenue generated by the improvement will flow
into the special fund and there will be no diversion of
the revenues now going into the general fund. This
court's language in Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83
Utah 321, 28 P. 2d 161 (1933), a companion case to
Fjeldsted seems to go right to the heart of the issue in
the instant case. The court held "Where improvements
or betterments are built into an existing system or project, the revenues earned by such improvements or betterments, based on proper appraisement of the old system and the improvements and betterments may be
pledged to the payment of revenue bonds as provided in
the Act without vote of the qualified taxpaying electors
. . ." 28 P. 2d at 175.
It appears that a discussion of Fjeldsted may be unnecessary in light of the court's decision in Conder v.
University of Utah, 123 Utah 182, 257 P. 2d 367 (1953),
where the court would not apply the Fjeldsted restriction
in aUowing the bonds to be repaid from a special fund
revenue of which part had previously been put in a general fund. It appears that Fjeldsted may in fact be overruled or at least limited to the isolated facts of that particular case. If overruled, Utah would then be brought
into oonfbiimity with the majority of jurisdictions.
POINT III.
THE P R O P O S E D

REDEVELOPMENT
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AGENCY BONDS WILL NOT INVOLVE
LENDING OF CREDIT BY THE CITY, SALT
LAKE COUNTY OR THE STATE OF UTAH.
The Utah Neighborhood Act in Section 11-19-23.3 et
seq. prohibits any lending of credit by the city. Further,
we would reiterate our argument we have provided in
Point II of this brief dealing with a special fund concept,
as being determinative of this issue.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF THE PROPOSED PARKING FACILITY INVOLVES PUBLIC PURPOSES.
We would affirm the arguments as set forth in Respondent's Brief.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD
THAT THE ALLOCATION OF TAXES FOR'"'""
REDEVELOPMENT PURPOSES AND THE
USE OF THESE AND OTHER FUND IN
CONNECTION WITH THE REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
Article XII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution provides:
"The Legislature shall not impose taxes for
the purpose of any county, city, town or other
municipal awrporation, but may, by law, vest in
the corporate authorities thereof, respectively,
the power to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation."
There is nothing in this section of our Constitution
which is violated by the Utah Neighborhood Development Act. The legislature in this act does not impose
taxes for the purpose of the cities but vests in the local
governmental body the right to initiate the tax increment
concept and in so doing allocate increased revenues from
higher assessed valuation resulting from redevelopment.
The enabling provisions of the Development Act
follows the provisions and requirements of Section 5.
We would further concur with the additional arguments on this point as set forth by respondent.
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN
ITS DETERMINATION THAT B U D G E TARY LAWS REGULATING CITIES ARE
NOT APPLICABLE TO THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY.
We would affirm the arguments as set forth in Respondent's Brief,
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POINT VII.
THE PROPOSED ALLOCATION OF TAXES
USING AN ASSESSED VALUATION BASE
DETERMINED IN 1970 IS NOT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF A STATUTE WHERE THE MILL
LEVY TO BE APPLIED TO THE VALUATION BASE IS PROSPECTIVE.
We would affinm the arguments as set forth in Respondent's Brief.
POINT VIII.

APELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MEET
THE BURDEN OF OVERCOMING A PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTION OF THE UTAH NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT AND THE
VALIDITY AND CORRECTNESS OF THE
TRIAL COURT HOLDING.
We would affirm the arguments as set forth in Respondent's Brief.
CONCLUSION
The cities of Ogden, Brigham, Provo and St. George
respectfully submit to this honorable court that the Utah
Neighborhood Development Act does not violate the letter or spirt of the Utah Constitution but in fact follows
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
the guide lines of both the Constitution and the interpretation given the Constitution by this Court.
Thet Act including the bonding provisions thereof
provide the cities of this state a feasible method to redevelop and rehabilitate their central city of their blighted
conditions. Through rehabilitation, made possible by the
tax increment concept, Utah cities can look for the reduction of crime, health and economic problems. The
Act also provides for an agency which can act as a
conduit for federal monies coming into Utah cities for
redevelopment.
We submit there is no delegation by the legislature
to a special commission inasmuch as the local governmental body initiates the program and the voter through
the ballot box can control the actions of the agency.
The agency bonds will not constitute a debt of the
city because the legislature has made it very clear that
the agency is not a subdivision or department of the city.
If this court rules the agency is simply a department of
the city the bonds should not be considered a debt of the
city as a result of this Court's adopting the special fund
doctrine.
The Redevelopment Agency bonds will not involve
lending of credit by the city and the allocation of taxes
for redevelopment does not violate the constitution because it is not an imposition upon the cities by the legislature but rather an enabling power given to them in
conformity with the Constitution.
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We, therefore, urge this Court to uphold the trial
court's decision in declaring the Utah Neighborhood Development Act constitutional.
Respectfully submitted,
PARLEY R. BALDWIN
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
Ogden City
Brigham City
Provo City
City of 9t. George
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